 Wysłany: Pon 3:48, 25 Kwi 2011 Temat postu: On the state as investor of state-owned enterprise |
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| On the state as investor of state-owned enterprise financial management
[Abstract] This paper analyzes the state as investor and the state as regulator of social management and macroeconomic management of the distinction between state-owned enterprises that the state as investor and financial management of state-owned enterprises should be divided into state as the ultimate investor capital of the middle who among donors on the management and the management of two levels of state-owned enterprises, and through the establishment of a sound financial decision-making appropriate mechanism, incentive and restraint mechanisms and monitoring mechanisms to achieve. This paper also regulate the state as investor of state-owned enterprises and financial monitoring mechanism in the form of an analysis of state-owned enterprises to put forward policy recommendations to appoint financial supervisors. [Key words] the investor; state-owned enterprise financial management; financial mechanism; financial supervision state-owned enterprises is a leading force in the national economy, the management of state-owned enterprises has always been our government's economic management focus of the work. Reform and opening up, especially since the Third Plenary Session of fourteen state-owned capital management system has undergone significant changes, the state as investor of state-owned enterprises to exercise management functions of the owner and the Government as a social exercise of macroeconomic management and administration gradual separation of the functions of the state owned enterprise content management, asset management changed from the current capital management. Changes in state-owned capital management system brings a new subject, that is, under the conditions of the socialist market economy and modern enterprise system, how to strengthen the state as investor and financial management of state-owned enterprises, this paper attempts to make some analysis of this topic. a state as investor and the state as regulator of social management and macroeconomic management of state-owned enterprises difference 1. the definition of national donors. Investors who want to study the state management of state-owned enterprises, first of all deal with Countries where investor is the owner of state-owned enterprises. In theory, the state-owned enterprises should be funded by all the people, but this explanation does not help the management of state-owned enterprises. Property owners to resolve the virtual state capital issues, the need for a representative of all the people and countries can exercise their rights and obligations of the owner of the physical organization. The large number of state-owned enterprises under the circumstances, the entity is divided into two levels of organization can be envisaged: one directly attributable to the National People's Congress or the State Department-led solely state-owned State-owned capital management capital management committee, as the ultimate all state-owned enterprises persons; Second, the state capital and state-owned enterprises management committee to set a number of intermediate investor - state capital investors, the state capital investors in the state capital within the Commission authorized the exercise of the functions of ownership of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, the state-funded study in this paper include the state-owned Capital Management Committee and the state capital investors two levels. present, China's state-owned assets management system is in accordance with the State Council reform, the former state-owned Assets Administration Bureau and the Ministry of Finance who has set up a solely state-owned capital management agencies, local governments have also set up corresponding organizations solely on the management of state capital, these specially management of state capital on behalf of the state-funded agency's highest level. Capital investment management system by setting up state-owned central and local levels of state capital investment company, state-owned capital management company, state-owned holding companies, is the state capital investors in the middle of this article donors. 2. the state as investor of state-owned enterprise management and the state as regulator of social management and macroeconomic management of the difference between state-owned enterprises. As a social management and macroeconomic regulation and control, the State management scope of business includes not only state-owned enterprises, but also non-state enterprises, and rely mainly on economic and legal regulation of national industrial policy instruments to promote the implementation and realization of social and economic development objectives, its main duties are: (1) Health and peaceful development of enterprises and create basic conditions, such as provision of basic public facilities, establishing a social security system; (2) the economic activities of enterprises to develop the basic rules of law; (3) for various enterprises to create an equal competitive environment, establish and improve the production factor markets, and promote the rational flow of social and economic resources and optimize the configuration. The means of their management through legislation, industrial policy and the use of economic levers and so on. countries as donors on the management of enterprises have limited capital investment in state-owned enterprises, including state-owned enterprises, state-owned holding enterprises and state-owned capital capital shareholding enterprises, the right to participate as contributors who did not state capital investment in business management. Funded by the state as the exercise of the powers of the state-owned enterprises by the laws, regulations and decisions of the Articles of Association, etc., without directly intervening in business under the premise of achieving effective control of the operator, effectively protect the interests of the state as investor does not are violated, the management tool is mainly based on the accepted donors and improve the incentive and restraint mechanisms. Second, why should strengthen the state as investor of state-owned enterprise financial management the current state from the investor point of view on how to strengthen the financial management of state-owned enterprises, has become the focus of attention. The reason for the strengthening of national state-owned enterprises as the investor's financial management is based on the following reasons: 1. To achieve national objectives as the investor needs to manage. As mentioned earlier, the state as investor and the state as regulator of social management and macroeconomic management of state-owned enterprises are significantly different, reflected in the management objectives, the state owned enterprises as investment managers, the goal should be to ensure that state-owned capital the preservation and appreciation. At this point, it is a private investor with the goal of enterprise management should be no difference between the investor and the goal is precisely the goal of financial management. The state-owned enterprises to be adopted by countries other objectives, the managers of state as a social and macroeconomic regulation and control by the scope of state-owned enterprise management,p90x calendar, these goals should be through legislation, price leverage, financial subsidies and other means to achieve them. In order to achieve the state as investor of state-owned enterprise management objectives, it must rely on and use the means and methods of financial management, investor and state-owned enterprises establish and improve financial management mechanisms, including: (1) correctly state capital investment decisions, reasonably determine the state capital to invest in state-owned capital investment, withdrawal, transfer decision-making; (2) the operator of state-owned capital budget approval, the development of performance evaluation and reward system implementation of the incentive; (3) approval State-owned money managers in the financial accounts, capital gains distribution on matters of state financial decisions; (4) of the major operators of state-owned capital for financial supervision and financial activities. 2. establishing a modern enterprise system. How to study the state as investor of state-owned enterprises to strengthen financial management, in essence, is the reform of the financial mechanism of state-owned enterprises. And the financial mechanism and are closely related with the enterprise system. Will be in clearly establishing a modern enterprise system as the target of state-owned enterprise reform, before the reform of state-owned enterprises in China, has experienced enterprise fund system, profit retention, and profit and loss lump sum system, two-step profit delivery, the contract responsibility system, and several stages , their common drawback is the same in the traditional framework of state-owned property under the premise of transferring part of the franchise, rather than the reorganization of the structure of corporate property rights and property rights system innovation, the depth of reform reach the end of the core enterprise system - property system. Proved difficult to achieve either of these reforms supervision, and constraint mechanism to the operators, so that After years of exploring the long and difficult reforms, until the Third Plenary Session of the Fourteenth Party proposed to establish a modern enterprise system as the target of state-owned enterprise reform, we finally found the key to solving the problem. and state-owned enterprise reform through the tortuous road that, like the reform of the financial mechanism of state-owned enterprises has been just how to deal with the state enterprises in the supply of funds approach, the distribution relationship between the state and enterprises, is to focus financial resources or to expand Corporate Property, that is in The reason, one of the most important thing is not to establish and improve the financial mechanism, not straighten out the financial relationship within the enterprise, there is no financial functions within the enterprise will be different levels and departments to implement the scientific division of labor, financial management Zequan Li no specific decomposition, implementation and clear. Such as economic reform process of gradually expanding the enterprise financial management autonomy, we can expand to enumerate how many property rights of enterprises, but these property rights is how within the enterprise in accordance with the principle of combining Zequan Li, the specific decomposition to business owners, operators, corporate finance department do? Not specifically answer these questions, I am afraid that the state can say is to straighten out the financial relationship between enterprises, and can not be said to be truly establish a sound corporate financial mechanism. Thus, the reform of the financial mechanism of business financial management is not only a need to study the problem itself, but also to establish modern enterprise system, establish a sound business decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism with the binding problem of meaning . As donors to strengthen national financial management of state-owned enterprises to achieve separation of ownership of real and establish a modern enterprise system has a crucial importance. 3. the reform of state-owned enterprise personnel management system needs. Over the years, chairman of state-owned enterprises, the general manager and other administrative duties to be considered a must by the organization departments and personnel departments for appointment and removal of state-owned shares on behalf of the delegation also highly irregular, many local government authorities led by the act of state Equity representatives, some by government authorities or leaders of other leave, retirement as a representative of the state-owned shares, and some places are directly appointed by the competent authorities of the former enterprise directors and managers as. These practices are essentially government-owned assets management department in the state-owned enterprises, regardless of the institutional embodiment of Personnel Management. Information management functions in the separation of administration from the premise of the personnel management system of state-owned enterprises should make the appropriate changes. State-owned enterprises should directors, supervisors, and representatives of the equity return to the investor the right to delegate. Countries as an important investor of state-owned enterprises management personnel appointment and removal should not be through administrative means, but through economic means, according to operating capacity and operating results, appointment, evaluation operators. Therefore, strengthening the state as investor of state-owned enterprises contribute to the financial management of state-owned enterprise reform of the personnel management system, enabling the management of personnel and management of assets (the) combination. 4. to establish a socialist market economy, the need for monitoring mechanisms. In recent years, a huge loss of state assets, a serious distortion of accounting information has aroused great attention. This phenomenon shows that our economy is not perfect supervision mechanism. To the state-owned enterprises, internal supervision, owner supervision, administrative supervision and community supervision can straighten out the end of the relationship, especially because the absence of owners led to the supervision and management rights of ownership of weakening. Investors in a clear context, the strengthening of national state-owned enterprises as the investor's financial management, benefit through appropriate institutional arrangements and the necessary control measures to strengthen investor and the financial activities of the operators and the business activities of the restraint and supervision, the operator to change the current situation of soft constraints, and to straighten out the financial supervision system, improve economic monitoring mechanism to lay a good foundation. Third, to strengthen the state as investor of state-owned enterprise financial management, corporate finance theoretical basis for reform of the mechanism and the modern enterprise system has a flesh and blood relationship, research to strengthen the state as investor of state-owned the financial management issues, can not do without modern business theory. modern enterprise system, three main areas: the configuration of control right and exercise; on the board of directors, managers and employees on their job performance monitoring, and evaluation; incentive mechanism design and implementation of [2] . in the modern enterprise system involves three aspects, the different configuration of control determined by the different decision-making mechanism, which depends on the ultimate ownership of property and legal property rights arrangements. Any incentives and supervision and restraint system design and operation are based on certain decision-making mechanism based on no certain decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism will be constrained in the air. Currently, on the establishment of modern enterprise system, many people just to mention establish a sound business incentives and supervision and restriction mechanism, establish a sound business while ignoring the premise that the decision-making mechanism. We believe that the decision-making mechanism is the most basic contents of the enterprise system, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism is bound to make decision-making mechanism to play its role more effectively established. If there is no reasonable incentives, decision-makers to create their own motivation and ability to hard to get into full play, they will not make a commitment to greater business risk to their own decision-making, corporate nature is difficult to operate well. However, the only decision-making mechanisms and incentives is not enough, there is no effective mechanism of supervision and restraint, moral hazard and asymmetric information as the reason, even the best design decision-making mechanism and incentives are futile. Thus, decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of restraint in the modern enterprise system, the three elements are inseparable, indispensable. modern theory, from the applied methods can be divided into three main theories: First, transaction cost economics; second principal - agent theory; Third, property rights theory. These three theories of modern contract theory is inextricably linked. In these three theories, transaction cost economics theory limited to research focused on the relationship between enterprises and markets; principal - agent theory focuses on an analysis of internal organizational structure and membership of the agency relationship between the property rights theory is not the main research contract generated by complete residual claim and residual control of the distribution and the impact on efficiency. These three theories have in common is a contractual emphasis on corporate, contractual incompleteness and the resulting importance of business ownership. Relatively speaking, the principal - agent theory and property rights theory of corporate financial system reform more meaningful guidance. principal - agent theory is that: as long as there is job placement, and in this arrangement depends on a person's being done by another person, agency relationship existed. Jensen and Mike Lint agency relationship is defined as a contractual relationship, in this contract, a person or more people (ie the principal) hire another person (the agent) to perform certain services on their behalf, including the number of decision-making power entrusted to the agent. Principal-agent relationship exists not only among business owners and managers, but throughout all levels of business management, such as between the board and managers, between managers and department managers, between managers and general employees. But no matter which level is the principal-agent relationship, the agent's actions are rational (or bounded rationality) and the self-interest-oriented features, leading to exist between principal and agent to pursue goals and interests of the differences and information asymmetry problems, so need to build checks and balances to overcome the potential abuse of power, through incentives to encourage agents to maximize the beneficial interests of the client decision-making. property rights theory is an incomplete from the enterprise contract starting demonstrated residual claim and residual control of the arrangements. The study shows that property rights theory: asymmetric information and incomplete contract conditions, there is no detailed provisions in the contract that part of power, that power should belong to the remaining assets of the owners. At the same time, solve the incomplete contract approach to incentive problems when the ownership of the property is allocated, that is, who is the owner, who has control of the property, the right to solve the incomplete contract will come when the incentive problems, and optimal incentive mechanism should be is the maximum residual claim and residual control of the corresponding mechanism. research results of modern theory of corporate financial management theory to the research and development has injected vigor and vitality, but also the construction of the financial mechanism for enterprises to provide important theoretical basis. Learn modern theory of the research results, some of our financial scholars (Kwok Fu-chu asked, dry Sheng Road, Xie Zhihua, Tang Guliang, etc.) put forward the corporate financial donors decomposition (owner) financial and operators of financial theory. Xie Zhihua said: separation of ownership and under the conditions of the relationship between investors and managers, in essence, is the financial relationship; not only the operators to carry out financial management, the investor must carry out financial management, which were funded by the formation of financial and financial management; investor and financial management of the real problem is that investors who act on the financial constraints of the operators to ensure the safety of their capital and value-added [5]. Tang Guliang that: the concept of legal property rights made, so that the original set of owners, managers, financial staff functions in a financial management system, developed as owners, managers, financial officers of the division of labor As owners and operators of financial financial financial subject, based on the concept of property rights, financial objectives, financial target content management functions are all different, therefore, the construction of enterprise financial system must be integrated with the financial and business owners who finance their own characteristics, that is the owner of the financial mechanism should be constructed separately and operators of the financial mechanism. Research funded by the state as the financial management of state-owned enterprises are state-owned enterprises should be constructed of course, the owner of the scope of the financial mechanism, the owner should be an appropriate financial management theory learn from the research results. is worth noting that, at present there is a view that under the conditions of the modern enterprise system, the enterprise legal person system established, the owner is just a control mechanism for the financial, rather than a decision-making mechanism. If this view holds, means of financial decision-making mechanisms and financial incentives to owners is meaningless. We believe that the defect in this view. As mentioned above, any one of a sound enterprise system should be the decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of the organic binding combination, which will be separated to any part of a separate meaningless. In addition, the owner of financial topics from the point of view, the right to decide the company's operating policies and investment, merger, division and other plans, the right to decide on capital increase, debt and other major fund-raising activities, have the right to decide on profit distribution plan the right hiring managers, assessment of its performance and determine their remuneration, etc., and through these activities to achieve the financial activities of the operators to carry out financial constraints, so as to achieve the objectives of capital preservation and appreciation. Clearly, from the owner of the financial management of the content, the owner can not do without the financial management of the same financial decision-making mechanism and incentive mechanism. The idea that the owner of the financial point of view is just a control mechanism is essentially the owner of the financial management of the purpose and content of the confusion. Fourth, the state as investor of state-owned enterprises to strengthen the financial management fifth session of the Fourth Plenary Session decided that: , classification management, authorization management, the principle of division of labor supervision, and gradually establish state-owned assets management, supervision, operation system and mechanism, and a sound system of strict liability. due to the current large number of state-owned enterprises in China, the state as investor can not directly address the management of each state-owned enterprises must be in accordance with the fifth identified Fourth Plenary Session of the authority to establish state-owned assets management system, prompting the state-owned the functions of the capital investor in place to address the absence of owners over the years the problem of state-owned capital. To this end, state-owned enterprises as the ultimate funders of the national and state-owned enterprises should set up a value. States as the ultimate investor only Therefore, the state as investor's financial management of state-owned enterprises should be divided into two levels: the state as the ultimate funder of the here, as said they are also contributors to exercise the functions of donors. As investor whose primary function is decision-making, motivation, discipline and supervision to indirect management of the main, and as operators whose primary function is to plan, organize, coordinate and control, to direct management of the main. Therefore, the state as investor of state-owned enterprise financial management and financial management of the operators (including the because they were based on the ultimate investor and intermediate donors as the main owner of the financial management of the objects. In this sense, the two levels of investor and financial management of the objects and their contents are different, but as donors, their financial management objectives are the same, are to achieve capital preservation and maximum appreciation. Therefore, its financial management is basically the same way. We believe that the state as investor of state-owned enterprise financial management, from the following aspects: 1. To establish a scientific investor to participate in major financial decision-making mechanism. Capital investment will be granted the right to operate an agent, based on the operators retain the option, income distribution, the three major decision-making rights for the conditions. How to protect the investor to the correct implementation of these powers, we must rely on donors to establish a scientific mechanism to participate in major financial decisions. Issues in the major financial decisions, there are still a number of government-owned, regardless of the phenomena, such as: state-owned large enterprises, major infrastructure investment decisions to be approved by the State Planning Commission, major technical transformation projects to be approved by the State Economic and Trade Commission and so on. Administrative means to manage the business and working capital, will definitely lead to a new witch hunt. Therefore, decision-making power should be returned to those who exercise the power of the state-funded institutions and state-owned capital management capital investors. major financial donors to participate in decision-making mechanism should be clear the following: (1) the decision by the donors to approve major investment, financing programs, capital transfer, asset restructuring and disposal of major assets, issues, income allocation and other major financial decision criteria and range; (2) significant financial decision-making procedures and modalities, including the property on behalf of the delegation and exercise of their right to vote, a major financial decision-making mode of procedure of approval processes; (3) information on major financial decisions reporting and feedback system. on the state-owned holding company-level financial decision-making mechanism, we think we can establish a state-owned holding company board of directors (or board, the same below), president (or manager, the same below) and business sector decision-making body of the financial decisions system. Board as the state-owned holding company decision-making center, is responsible for the holding company's financial strategic decisions and operational activities of major capital decisions, holding company president and is responsible for the activities of daily decision-making and capital operation of law or the Articles of Association shall be exercised on the holding company owned enterprises decision-making power of major financial activities, the business sector on the one hand holding company headquarters in daily financial decision making, on the other hand the decision-making on matters of their respective corporate boards determine the decision-making advice, and through the property rights assigned to their respective corporate representatives, the exercise of their respective companies voting rights on the board. state-owned holding company board of directors is responsible for administration of state-owned capital should be in the company's strategic decision to play a ) to formulate medium and long term development planning and major projects of the investment program, reported state-owned capital management agencies for approval and implementation; (2) to formulate the annual financial budget, income distribution and losses to make up for the program, reported state-owned capital management agencies for approval and implementation ; (3) to formulate plans for change in the registered capital, issue debt and the company work plans; (5) decided to acquisition, merger, sale of other businesses and corporate property rights under the program; (6) determine the total annual loans, loans to enterprises under the decision of the annual total degree of security; (7) decision to the Board of Directors, Chairman, President and the matters authorized subordinate enterprises. (  to decide on president, vice president and director of compensation and payment; (9) Board of Directors decided to establish the appropriate body to decide the company's basic management system. In addition to state-owned capital management agencies on these first three directly exercise their right to decide financial matters, other financial matters are delegated to the state through its holding company on behalf of the property (usually served as chairman of state holding company) to exercise the right to vote.
president of the state-owned holding company of the board of directors, organizing the implementation of Board resolutions, full charge of the company's daily operation and management. If the Board decision mainly on the holding company's overall strategic plan, then president of strategic decision-making mainly about the implementation of the decision-making, and more directly related to the respective companies. President of the main exercise the following powers: (1) organizing the implementation of resolution of the board, overall charge of the company's daily operations and management; (2) development of the company, the long-term development plans, annual operating plan and the use of program income, the company's annual financial budget and final program to make up for losses; (3) to prepare plans to increase or decrease of registered capital and issuance of corporate bonds proposal; (4) development of internal management structure; (5) to draw up the rules and regulations; (6) drew the Board's appointment or dismiss the chief financial officer; decide on other functions of the appointment and removal of department heads; decide headquarters staff recruitment, remuneration, reward and punishment and dismissal; (7) certification under the corporate long-term development plans, annual business plans and major investment and other matters ; ( the amount authorized by the Board to decide investment, loans, guarantees and other matters of subordinate enterprises, decided to dispose of corporate assets and fixed assets, purchasing, approval of financial expenditures; (9) According to the chairman of the board authorized, on behalf of the company to sign various contracts and agreements; issued daily administrative, operational and other documents.
and financial decision-making state-owned holding company closely related to the business management department are Finance Department, Business Management, Asset Management Department, Ministry of Investment and Development, with its division of responsibility in their president's decision-making within the context of provide decision-making information and advice, and is responsible for receiving significant financial activities of enterprises under the decision-making application of the general meeting of shareholders owned enterprises which are subject to decision-making matters, the application will be owned enterprises and the sector forward with the preliminary review, President of advice for decision making by the president ; on the part of Board decisions should be matters of affiliated enterprises, from business management advice directly determine the decision-making, and timely advice to decision-making be notified in writing of approval on behalf of property rights. state-owned holding companies to participate in the establishment of a major state-owned enterprises on the basis of financial decision-making mechanism, but also urged state-owned enterprise managers to build sound financial management of the financial decision-making mechanism, so that the financial decision-making state-owned enterprises to efficiently reasonable to run. 2. to establish the financial decision-making mechanism and incentive compatible. Incentives of the decision on the production of rooted differences. Different levels and types of financial decisions on the financial goals may have different effects. Therefore, senior management personnel, the design of the incentive mechanism should first be compatible with the decision-making mechanism, incentive mechanism will truly control (decision-making power) and the right to a reasonable allocation of the remaining matches. Construction of state-owned enterprises senior management personnel of the incentive mechanism, not only to consider directly engaged in production activities, the senior management of state-owned enterprises on how to motivate, but also to engage in further research on the operational activities of the state-controlled capital the company's senior management on how to motivate, to completely change the existing state-owned holding company's senior management personnel administration colors, make state-owned holding company's senior management personnel create a true entrepreneur. As for the Therefore, the state-owned capital management agencies in the design of state-owned holding company-level incentives for senior managers, it can not copy the design of state-owned holding company of state-owned enterprise managers incentives. Similarly, for senior managers with decision-making control over the chairman of the implementation of incentive policies and the right to have decision-making, general manager of the incentive policies should be different. Our overall plan is incentive mechanism to distinguish between the long-term incentives relative to short-term incentives, long-term incentive and long-term interests of the deciding match the long-term decisions, short-term incentive is the recent interest and deciding match of short-term decision-making. Mainly to long-term incentive equity, options, forward cover, pension plans and other incentives in the form, mainly to short-term incentive bonuses, jobs and other forms of consumption. According to this vision, the state-owned holding company-level managers should be based on long-term incentive-based, while the operators of state-owned enterprise level Zeyi mainly short-term incentives; at the same level of senior management personnel in decision-making on the responsibility control operators (such as the Chairman of the Board. Chairman), the incentive should bear the decision-making than the enforcement powers of the managers (such as the holding company's president and general manager of state-owned enterprises) and encourage more use of long-term incentive. Specifically, for the senior managers of state-owned enterprises should implement yuan reform compensation structure of the salary, the rewards from a variety of different types of parts, part of a fixed base salary income, which should not be part of the revenue too high, the general should be the average wage of 3 to 5 times; the other is the risks associated with operating performance income, this part of the income and then divided into the current income (in cash bonus, payable in cash or in kind, post consumer) and long-term income. Long-term deferred income mainly taken the form of payment, the remuneration of senior management personnel, the accounting figures from the period determined, but in calculating the actual payment after a period of several years, once or installments. At the same time agreed in the compensation contract, negligence, if found to be inspiring to the detriment of business interests, you can pay part of the protest Shangmo. The deferred payments with a protest possible ways to encourage senior management to meet their long-term interests of the decision-making, effectively avoid the immediate payment of short-term caused by the tendency of operators behavior. On this basis, should gradually establish and improve the operators holding system in the qualified enterprises to try to stock option and high pension plans, so as to gradually expand the senior managers of the proportion of long-term income to promote business Behavior of the permanent. 3. to establish the operator financial budget and final accounts of the examination and approval system, hardening budget constraints. In establishing a scientific and financial decision-making mechanism to adapt the premise of the incentive mechanism should be established for operators of financial budget and final accounts and approval system, including: approval of the operator's long-term financial strategy and goals planning, approval of annual financial budgets and final accounts and annual financial reports, hardening budget constraints, the objective of financial management to the financial budget to implement them break down and build the core of capital preservation and appreciation of the financial evaluation index system of evaluation for operators to develop the principles, methods, so that incentives role into full play. 4. to establish an effective financial supervision and investor constraint mechanism. For a long time, due to the absence of the principal owners of state-owned enterprises, which failed to establish the state as investor of state-owned enterprises on an effective mechanism of restraint and supervision, resulting in some state-owned enterprises in the emergence of the mere figurehead who will and interests, a serious distortion of accounting information, serious loss of state-owned capital. Around the financial oversight of state-owned enterprises, central and local underwent a lot of useful experiment and explore, to create all sorts of monitoring forms, such as: accountant, Chief Financial Officer appointment system, the special inspector system, the central corporate financial Mill member system, the Financial Ombudsman system and the national audit and social audit, inspection and other financial and economic discipline. These practices are enhanced to some extent, financial supervision, and curb the loss of state capital, also to a certain extent, improve the quality of accounting information, and curb the spread of false accounting, and achieved some success. But it should be noted, whether in theory or in operation, these forms of financial supervision and many shortcomings and deficiencies, worthy of further exploration and improvement. according to the modern theory of the firm, the enterprise is the essence of a combination of a series of contract is a contract, and between investors and managers as the core of the agency contract. Accounting practices are based on the formation of such a contract the responsibility of the parties relationship as a link, constantly on the trustees fiduciary duty to perform and complete the process and results of the recognition, measurement and reporting. In this sense, accounting is a direct service to the trustee, the trustee reported by the relevant accounting information to the client indirectly serve the clients. the investor as a client and as a trustee of the operators access to information in terms of fiduciary duties in the asymmetric state, in order to manipulate accounting practices to prevent the operator to provide false information to a variety of clients information on ways to strengthen the supervision of fiduciary duty, verification is necessary. Contains the essence of the modern enterprise system is the right of ownership on the effective supervision of management. This supervision is between ownership and management rights in a power checks and balances. However, if in order to strengthen supervision will be subject to the operator of the corporate accounting practices led to direct control by the investor, this pattern of checks and balances will be destroyed, not only do not meet the requirements of modern enterprise system, and will be assessment of the operator in a passive, isolated position, is bound to dampen the enthusiasm of the operators. We believe that the structural state as investor of state-owned enterprises of the new system of financial supervision should be in accordance with the established norms of the modern enterprise system and the requirements of corporate governance structure, to correctly handle the supervisor who is appointed, who appointed monitor , appointed supervisors monitor what and how monitoring and other issues. In monitoring the way the state as investor of state-owned enterprises should take the regular financial monitoring supervision and regular monitoring combination. The state as investor of state-owned enterprises can be taken to appoint the financial supervision system, but the identity of the delegate, function and form of supervision must be re-arranged. This appointment system can be called And the aforementioned countries as investor of state-owned enterprise management at two levels corresponding to the state as investor of state-owned enterprise's financial supervisory system should also be divided into two levels. Specifically, that: (1) state capital on behalf of the State to exercise its ultimate ownership of the department authorized by the intermediate donors express their will. No matter which level of financial supervisors appointed, should be supervision of enterprises as a key member of the board of supervisors; financial remuneration of supervisors appointed by the department decision; its role is to be made by the supervisory board of directors of the major operating and financial decisions of the legitimate rationality to supervise the implementation of resolutions of the Board of Managers to monitor the situation, and the right to board of directors, managers and investors to damage the interests of the company to correct the behavior; financial supervisors may attend board meetings, but do not have the right to vote. This is entirely appointed representative of Financial Supervisors funded the interests of the exercise of supervision, not to participate in business decisions. state as investor of state-owned enterprises on a regular basis mainly to the financial supervision commission public auditing institutions or national audit audit form. Special inspector, the Financial Ombudsman should constantly strengthen the supervision of the national audit, social audit and streamline the corporate governance structure based on the gradual abolition of, or be appointed to the board of supervisors of state-owned enterprises, specialized financial and accounting exercise of oversight functions, in order to avoid external oversight body supervise complex and duplication and reduce unnecessary monitoring costs. Reference l, Ding Xuedong market economy and financial management. Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1998; 8113 2, Shi-white of the main property. Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1998; 12:294 3, Guo Fu-chu research and development of financial theory. Finance Science, 1997; 6 4, of dry winning Road to create owner finance. Finance Science, 1997; 6 5, Xie Zhihua financial donors of. Accounting Research, 1997; 5:25 6, Tang Guliang operator and the Finance of eleven hierarchical management structure of the modern enterprise. 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